The International Initiative Co-operation and Collaboration for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

“The International Initiative Co-operation and Collaboration for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy”

Executive Summary

The Partitioning and Transmutation (P&T) option as an alternative Waste Management Strategy is examined in this papers along different lines. The International collaboration for advanced reactor and fuel cycle development such as INPRO and GIF also address in this papers together with the cooperation between INPRO and GIF to avoid overlapping. The global suggestion for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, such as MNA and GNEP also describe in this paper together with pros and cons. The last of this final term paper is the description on importance of promoting the Co-operation and Collaboration for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy together with several recommendation for the international community to urgently address several issues.

1. The Role and Methodology  of  partitioning and transmutation (P&T) of spent fuel

The first approach is a global analysis of the present situation in the backend of the fuel cycle where it appears that two opposite concepts (direct disposal versus reprocessing and PU reuse) are equally important on the world scene. In order to allow P&T to be fully developed a doubling of the present conventional reprocessing capacity is required. The radioactive source term with long term implications is discussed and the relative importance of each of the long lived nuclides is quantified on the basis of their hazard index and its evaluation as a function of cooling time. The radiochemical and nuclear engineering data of Minor Actinides (MA) and Long Lived Fission Products (LLFP) show that, on the basis of their radio-toxicity indexes, the Pu 241 – Am 241 – Np 237 sequence has the greatest radiological impact followed by Am 243 as a precursor of Pu 239. In order to reduce HLLW to an actinide concentration level which is compatible with surface storage, very high DF’s are to be obtained. However a more reasonable approach is to reduce the concentration of MA and LLFP in a waste repository with a factor between 10 and 100 depending on the critical nuclide and on the prevailing hydrogeologic conditions. The reduction of the nuclide inventory will decrease the potential risk in the 1000 to 10.000 years period and reduce the time interval during which the proportionally decreased source term will determine the radiological impact of the repository on the geosphere.

The second field influencing the P&T option is the partitioning feasibility. Though extensive studies have been published on the partitioning of MA and LLFP an important effort will have to be accomplished in order to make the P&T option technologically valid. In the context of improved reprocessing the Np extraction deserves the first attention in order to quantitatively reroute this nuclide in one waste- or product stream, where it can be used as a starting point for transmutation operations. The extraction of Am – Cm from HLLW is still in the laboratory development stage but it appears that the coupling of an improved PUREX process flow sheet with the TRUEX process is capable of achieving a significant decontamination. The main issue to be resolved is the Am Cm / Rare Earth separation for which no fully satisfactory method is available. Among the LLFP, I-129 and Tc-99 are the most important ones and methods exist to transform them into a target for eventual transmutation. Other LLFP have only a limited radiological impact or cannot be separated unless isotopic separation is performed.

The third aspect of P&T is conditioning and fuel fabrication of MA which is the critical steps before transmutation can be envisaged. Np 237 can be homogeneously mixed with MOX fuel and submitted to irradiation in LWR and/or FBR’s, but the subsequent recycle operations will have to take into account increased Pu 238 concentration. Am – Cm recycle undoubtedly is the most difficult step since the separation from Rare Earths has not yet been accomplished on pilot scale and that a completely new remote handling technology has to be developed for that purpose. Pyrometallurgical processing of spent fuel to transform the MA into a new metal-alloy-type fuel is a new venture which needs a very large R&D effort to become comparable in confidence level with aqueous recycle methods.

The last and most important aspect of P&T is transmutation, which covers two distinct concepts: transmutation to a short lived actinide and/or incineration to fission products. Transmutation in LWR’S and HFR’s involves the transformation of Np 237 into Pu 238 and a buildup of a heavier isotope fraction of Am-Cm. Homogeneous recycling of MA in FBR’s is from reactor physics point of view feasible and the output of 6 LWR’S can be transmuted in one FBR of the same power. Heterogeneous recycle in FBR’s has principle advantages from fuel fabrication point of view but critical thermo-hydraulic problems have been encountered in the fuel assembly design. LMR’s and particularly ABR’s are the most suitable answers to the transmutation issue since their “incineration” potential is by far the highest among the fast reactors. The transmutation yield is yet limited to about 10 % per year which implies long transmutation periods for a given MA inventory. Accelerator driven transmutation is the most challenging option which will require very long R&D efforts to upgrade the high energy physics machines to production tools which can be operated in conjunction with a large nuclear inventory of MA arranged as a subcritical reactor vessel surrounding the proton beam inlet. The extreme high neutron fluxes attainable in such facilities provide a new outcome for long lived fission product transmutation.

2. International collaboration for advanced reactor and fuel cycle development.

2.1. International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO)

The 21st century will have the most competitive, globalized markets in human history, the most rapid pace of technological change ever, and the greatest expansion of energy use, particularly in developing countries. As IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said at the 50th IAEA General Conference, in September 2006, technological and institutional innovation is a key factor in ensuring the benefit from the use of nuclear energy for sustainability.

The International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) was initiated in 2001, on the basis of a resolution of the IAEA General Conference in 2000 [GC(44)/RES/21]. INPRO activities have since been continuously endorsed by resolutions of the IAEA General Conferences and by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

INPRO provides an open international forum for studying nuclear energy options, the associated requirements and the potential deployment of innovative nuclear energy systems in IAEA Member States. INPRO helps to make available knowledge that supports informed decision-making during the development and deployment of innovative nuclear energy systems and assists Member States in the coordination of related Collaborative Projects.

INPRO’s initial activity (Phase 1, 2001–2006) focused on the development of an assessment methodology to be used for screening an innovative nuclear system (INS), for comparing different INSs to find a preferred one consistent with the sustainable development of a given State and for identifying R&D needs.

The INPRO methodology, tested for consistency and completeness, has been published and documented in two IAEA Technical Documents, Methodology for the Assessment of Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (IAEA-TECDOC-1434) and Guidance for the Evaluation of Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (IAEA-TECDOC-1362). An additional User’s Manual, consisting of an overview volume plus a separate volume for each INPRO area of assessment, is in preparation to provide additional guidance on applying the INPRO methodology.

2.2. Generation IV International Forum (GIF)

The Generation IV International Forum, or GIF, was chartered in July 2001 to lead the collaborative efforts of the world’s leading nuclear technology nations to develop next generation nuclear energy systems to meet the world’s future energy needs.

Taking into account the expected increase in energy demand worldwide and the growing awareness about global warming, climate change issues and sustainable development, nuclear energy will be needed to meet future global energy demand.

Eight technology goals have been defined for Generation IV systems in four broad areas: sustainability, economics, safety and reliability, and proliferation resistance and physical protection. These ambitious goals are shared by a large number of countries as they aim at responding to economic, environmental and social requirements of the 21st century. They establish a framework and identify concrete targets for focusing GIF R&D efforts.

2.3. Coordination between INPRO and GIF

INPRO and the IAEA work together with the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) to create synergy and to avoid overlap:

§ By sending experts to the GIF Policy Group and to GIF working groups (Risk and Safety, Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection, Evaluation Modelling);

§ By reviewing each other’s documents, such as the evaluation methodologies, as appropriate;

§ By organizing regular coordination meetings.

The differences between INPRO and GIF include the following:

1. Mission and activities: GIF is primarily focused on R&D of nuclear technology to meet global needs. INPRO has a broad variety of missions and activities, including providing a forum for experts on necessary innovation in nuclear energy, developing a methodology to assess innovative nuclear systems, providing common user considerations for the deployment of nuclear power in developing countries, and facilitating international cooperation on technological issues.

2. Membership: GIF membership is limited to those countries that can bring substantial resources and expertise to its R&D programmes, whereas INPRO members include both developed and developing countries. INPRO is open to all IAEA Member States. Currently, all members of GIF are also members of INPRO.

The complementary nature of INPRO and GIF and the potential for creating synergies on nuclear technology development have been recognized by both organizations. GIF focuses on R&D and a methodology for system development, and INPRO covers (1) the assessment methodology, (2) infrastructure and institutional aspects, and (3) assistance to Member States for Collaborative Projects. INPRO combines both technology holders and users, and takes into account the particular needs of developing countries.

3. Pros & cons on global suggestion for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, such as MNA and GNEP.

3.1. The MNA Initiative of the IAEA

It is important to note that the sensitive parts of the fuel cycle include not only enrichment of fissile uranium and reprocessing, but also long term storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive wastes (SNF/HLW). This point is made clear in the 2005 report published by the Multilateral Approaches (MNA) Expert Group that the Director General of the IAEA set up in mid-2004. The MNA report addresses the security and non-proliferation issues in a manner directly applicable to all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, and suggests five specific approaches for multinational initiatives. The proposals made have specific implications for storage and disposal strategies.

The MNA Group identified as factors influencing the assessment of multilateral approaches “assurance of nonproliferation” and “assurance of supply and services”. The former objective is clearly easier to achieve if multinational storage and disposal facilities can be made available. Leaving spent fuel in dozens of locations for many decades is obviously less proliferation resistant than collecting the material into a smaller number of facilities in stable host countries with very strong safeguards controls. There have, in fact, been various proposals from potential hosts and user countries for shared storage facilities that can be well secured. However, in practice, it will be difficult to transfer SNF/HLW to another country for storage without some clarity on the end-point of the agreement. Returning cooled spent fuel to many countries after several decades or returning HLW from reprocessed spent fuel would simply reinstate the current proliferation and security risks of dispersed storage. Moreover, accepting returned SNF or HLW would compel small countries to seek national deep disposal solutions – in which case they may as well have retained the fuel for disposal. In short, the assurance of non-proliferation sought by the MNA Group could be most expeditiously attained by early implementation of shared storage facilities – but only with the essential ingredient of an agreed further step of disposal in multinational repositories. These could be either in the countries storing the waste or in a limited number of other, volunteering, host nations.

The MNA Group recognizes in its report that there is currently no international market for storage or disposal and recommends that the IAEA supports the concept “by assuming political leadership to encourage such undertakings”. Specific ways forward are possible based on two multinational repository scenarios that have already been defined by the IAEA – “partnering” (between small nations) and “add-on” (acceptance of foreign fuel by a large nuclear nation), as documented in TECDOC 1314. It is emphasized correctly by the MNA Group that disposal and storage of SNF/HLW should not be looked at in isolation, but as part of a broader nuclear strategy. Some of the Group’s five suggested approaches for encouraging multinational initiatives have specific implications for multinational disposal.

One proposal is “reinforcing existing commercial market mechanisms”, e.g. by commercial fuel banks, fuel leasing and fuel take-back and commercial offers to store and dispose of spent fuel. Commercial market mechanisms in the past have made possible the transfer of SNF with no return of wastes, e.g. to reprocessing plants in France, the UK and Russia. Increasing public and political pressures on the organizations involved led to these services being withdrawn. The potential acceptability of reintroducing disposal arrangements could be greatly enhanced by IAEA support and by an IAEA commitment to oversee rigorously, or even to co-manage, the facilities.

The most promising multilateral approach for geological disposal may be “creating, through voluntary agreements and contracts, multinational, and in particular regional, MNAs for new facilities based on joint ownership, drawing rights or co-management”. This can be done for front-end and back-end nuclear facilities, such as uranium enrichment; fuel reprocessing; disposal and storage of spent fuel. Recent Russian enrichment proposals go in this direction. For disposal, interest in the partnering scenario that could lead to regional facilities is clearly evidenced by recent developments, in particular in Europe. The Arius Association, founded in 2002, currently pursues this concept as its main activity. The European Commission has promoted the concept of regional repositories in Europe in its Council Directive on “the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste” and is also funding the SAPIERR project, which is studying the potential for regional repositories in Europe.

Another suggestion is “promoting voluntary conversion of existing facilities” to MNAs. In the case of geological repositories, there are no facilities currently in existence, although several countries have advanced projects leading to implementation – in particular Finland, the USA, Sweden and France. Each of these, however, has made it very clear that the repositories are purely national and will not accept foreign fuel or wastes. The general consensus in the waste disposal community is that success in these programmes will help the cause of geological disposal world-wide. If this success is currently more assured by purely national approaches, it should not be interpreted as evidence that only national programmes can succeed. Of course, new multinational facilities might also be constructed in the “add-on” scenario, involving a large nuclear programme.

3.2. The US GNEP Proposal

In early 2006, President Bush announced the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), under which America intends to work with nations that have advanced civilian nuclear energy programmes, such as France, Japan, and Russia. The prime domestic aim is to develop and deploy innovative, advanced reactors and new methods to recycle spent nuclear fuel. GNEP is, however, also meant to provide a reliable fuel services programme, under which a consortium of nations with advanced nuclear technologies would provide fuel and reactors to other countries that agree to refrain from fuel cycle activities. The hope is to develop an international regime that will allow for fuel leasing, so that fuel can be leased to a country interested in building a reactor and taking fuel, but then the fuel can be taken back to the fuel cycle country. This fuel leasing approach would provide an incentive for nations to forgo enrichment and reprocessing technology. The recipient countries should benefit from “the certainty that fresh fuel would be available when needed and that used fuel would be taken back under agreed and reasonable terms”.

The brief document published by USDOE in January 2007 provides a timely and useful overview of the GNEP vision and of how DOE intends to implement this. The three goals:

• Wider-scale use of nuclear energy;

• decreasing risks of proliferation and nuclear terrorism;

• addressing the challenges of disposal;

are all of great importance for global environmental, safety and security reasons.

The plan concentrates strongly on technological issues associated with enhancing the US capabilities for undertaking key fuel cycle activities. This is obviously important because of the US expertise that has been lost over the past decades. It also highlights the view that GNEP can postpone for a long time the need for a second repository in the USA, provided that the facilities for advanced fuel cycle operations are brought on line. The strategy is however, needs to be strengthened in one key point – how to win the support of other nations and thus achieve success in the area of enhancing global security. This crucial issue is addressed below.

The DOE document claims that “the GNEP vision has been well received by the international community” – but continues with the phrase “particularly among the leading fuel cycle states”. However, support by such States is relatively easy to achieve; GNEP can only help to restrict the market in a way that helps providers of fuel cycle services. The consensus between the providers was illustrated following a meeting in May 2007 of officials from China, France, Japan, Russia and the USA, with observers from the UK and the IAEA [8]. They issued a statement addressing the prospects for international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially in the framework of GNEP. Secretary Bodman of the USDOE was quoted as saying, “Today’s Joint Statement officially puts the ‘P’ in the Global Nuclear Energy ‘Partnership”. However, GNEP can work on the hoped for global scale only if the “P” for partnership includes also the smaller or the new nuclear programmes (Tier 2 countries) around the globe – countries that are to be prevented from having fuel cycle facilities (enrichment and reprocessing) that are their right under the current NPT that they have signed up to.

Currently, the only real incentive being offered to these Tier 2 countries is “reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for civil nuclear power reactors”. However, they need to have guarantees that costs will be indeed reasonable and – perhaps more important – guarantees of security of supply of fuel cycle services. For some small countries, the existing US consent over transfer and use of US origin nuclear materials has had negative impacts in the past (e.g. delays in shipping fuel for countries like Switzerland; ban of reprocessing for South Korea, etc.). Why should small countries now welcome a new regime that even more firmly creates a two tier status in the nuclear world? Unless the USDOE also engages the small countries in discussion and unless it can offer greater incentives than at present, there is little or no incentive for them to buy-in to the GNEP initiative.

For enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactor construction and reprocessing there is already a sufficiently competitive market. No activities in these areas have been blocked or slowed due to a lack of willing vendors. With GNEP, this competitive market may well shrink. What extra incentives does GNEP offer? The most tangible additional service offer is the take-back of spent fuel. This could, in principle, be extremely attractive, since deep geological repositories for limited amounts of wastes are very expensive and are also difficult to site, for both technical and societal reasons. Removing the disposal problem from small nuclear programmes could outweigh the possible disadvantages that GNEP might bring them.

But will GNEP actually remove the problem? Currently the stated principles include “taking back spent fuel for recycling”. The text is silent about whether the HLW resulting from recycling will be retained by the recycling service provider. These wastes were previously retained in the case of the UK, France and Russia – but all of these subsequently altered this policy due to public and political pressure. Will the USA (and other Tier 1 GNEP countries) be able to accept foreign HLW) for final disposal? This question will certainly cause intense debate further down the GNEP line.

Already in its comments on the GNEP proposal, the State of Nevada has posed the following pertinent questions:

“Does DOE intend to take spent fuel from foreign reactors? If so, how much? Where will it be stored? Will this be only U.S.-origin spent fuel or fuel of other origins as well? Does DOE contemplate sending the foreign waste to a U.S. repository? The Draft PEIS must make clear DOE’s expectations on receiving foreign power reactor spent fuel and should factor that expectation into the GNEP option to be considered. The situation concerning radioactive wastes or spent fuel is, in fact, even more problematic. Small countries with existing modest inventories of spent fuel will have little incentive to send future spent fuel arising to a foreign recycler if they have to implement a national deep repository anyway. Moreover, even those countries that initiate civilian nuclear programmes under a GNEP agreement for returning spent fuel will have small quantities of other long-lived radioactive residues from activities in power production, research and industry – and these must also be disposed of in a geological repository. As was pointed out in the Russian case, a comprehensive geological disposal service will have much greater chances of acceptance by users.

Currently, the back-end issues associated with GNEP are open and no global impact can be guaranteed. The USA can still build its proposed new fuel cycle facilities, including advanced reactors and reprocessing plants, and can hope in this way to revitalize nuclear programmes in the USA and even to postpone the necessary decisions about a second national repository. However, to achieve fully the laudable global environmental and security goals, the back-end must be addressed directly. The overdue discussions to be held must include not only the Tier 1 service suppliers but also the potential Tier 2 service users. A key component of the GNEP strategy will be greatly strengthened when USDOE gets directly involved in communicating with the relevant organizations in Tier 2 GNEP states.

4. Promotions for international co-operation and collaboration for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Each country must be free to choose for itself the energy sources suited to its national interests, needs and conditions. None should be deprived of access to the technology for peaceful and safe utilization of nuclear power. However, in an increasingly interdependent world, as long as nuclear energy was in use, close international co-operation would be necessary to ensure, on the one hand, that nuclear technology is not abused or misused, and, on the other, that its benefits are made available in a safe and secure manner.

International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy could reach its full potential, only in a world from which its potentially destructive uses had been eliminated. Therefore, our great challenge is to establish universal principles for the promotion of nuclear energy to contribute to sustainable growth of the global economy, solution of global warming problems, and meeting energy security needs, in well balance with furthering efforts to pursue the reduction of risks posed by threats of nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism, and existing nuclear weapons. The peaceful use of nuclear energy should not be exploited to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities. It is extremely important for the international community to make a long-term, sustained commitment to a ‘balanced’ approach to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in a world that is safer from nuclear risks. Therefore, we recommend the international community to urgently address the following issues.

Recommendation 1: Establish the “Three S” as universal guiding principles for safe and secure development of nuclear energy activities

Due to dual nature and necessity of risk management of nuclear energy, states that intend to introduce peaceful nuclear activities must take into account; a) Safety of their facilities and operation; b) Security of facilities and materials; and c) non-proliferation (or Safeguards). (“Three S”: Safety, Security, and Safeguards) For safe and peaceful promotion, mechanisms for international cooperation should be established in the areas of technical assistance such as human resource development as well as sharing best practice in safety, security and non-proliferation activities.

Recommendation 2: Provide appropriate international financial assistance schemes to nuclear energy programs and projects in developing countries

Capital procurement would be a key to expand nuclear energy worldwide. Nuclear power generation needs a large initial capital investment and requires a long-term payback period. Therefore, the international community should offer innovative financial mechanisms, with which private and public investment for the construction of nuclear reactors would be facilitated.

Recommendation 3: Address nuclear energy as an effective tool for coping with global warming and make appropriate schemes to incorporate nuclear energy into such efforts.

Currently, there is no incentive or mechanism to facilitate the utilization of nuclear energy for environmental purposes while nuclear energy is quite effective in terms of reducing CO2 emission. Such discrimination against nuclear energy might undermine international efforts to cope with global warming. We urge the international community to acknowledge that nuclear energy would be an effective way to contribute to containing the increase of CO2 emissions. Relevant mechanisms should be available for nuclear energy projects. In particular, we back the creation of a policy mechanism to systematically incorporate the promotion of nuclear energy in the efforts to tackle global warming in the new round of negotiations.

Recommendation 4: Address safety and liability properly both in the domestic regulatory framework and in international cooperation

The international community should provide cooperation with states which would like to introduce nuclear energy, in establishing a regulatory framework and administrative capacities in properly addressing safety and liability.

Recommendation 5: Universalize the Additional Protocol and enhance the export control regime

(1) Pursue universalization of the Additional Protocol

I believe that universalization of the Additional Protocol (AP) to IAEA safeguards agreements is one of the most important and effective ways to check nuclear proliferation. I recognize that it would be difficult to make the AP obligatory now. However, in the spirit of cooperation, and given the shared interests in reducing nuclear threats, the international community must create a more effective way to utilize the AP in multilateral and bilateral ways, for the objective of non-proliferation.

(2) Make adherence to Additional Protocol a condition for nuclear trade

Strengthening export control measures is essential for preventing proliferation.

Recommendation 6: Explore ways to utilize Assurance of Fuel Supply and Multilateral Approaches to nuclear fuel cycle for promoting non-proliferation and sharing nuclear energy opportunities.

(1) Reliable assurance of supply as key to effective multilateral mechanisms

Assurance of fuel supply for non-nuclear fuel cycle states (or multilateral approaches to nuclear fuel cycle) has significance in shaping and embedding robust non-proliferation norms and habits in the international community. The introduction of such mechanisms would contribute to non-proliferation.

(2) Multilateral mechanisms should not create new nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’

International interdependence is already a fact in the area of nuclear fuel supply, and it will be increasingly important as most ‘national’ fuel cycle programs have international elements. Therefore, for some countries — such as those with small scale nuclear programs — it would be more efficient to rely on an international mechanism as a backup to fuel procurement through market mechanisms. Multilateral approaches may provide an alternative measure for states to procure nuclear fuels.

There is also concern that such mechanisms could fix the status of supplier states (or ‘nuclear haves’) and consumer states (or ‘nuclear have-nots’) – in other words, they could create another form of discrimination in the international nuclear order. Therefore, it is necessary for such a mechanism to be flexible enough to accept various types of contribution by member states, depending on what they can provide to the mechanism. Such mechanisms must be inclusionary rather than exclusionary.

Recommendation 7: Address concerns over the backend of fuel cycle

We should also look at the entire nuclear fuel cycle, from mining to spent fuel management. Most countries with civilian nuclear reactors face problems related to management of spent fuel. To make international assurance of supply credible and attractive, we need to address the management of the backend of the fuel cycle. Providing viable spent fuel management options would further increase the reliability of international mechanisms for managing the nuclear fuel cycle.

Recommendation 8: Strengthen enforcement and implementation mechanisms for non-proliferation

(1) Strengthen supplementary measures

Policy measures such as UNSCR1540 and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) are important elements of the international non-proliferation regime.

(2) Make conditionalities for withdrawal from NPT

The exploitation of the provision for withdrawal in the NPT (Article X) is a great concern. Conditionality for withdrawal from NPT may be properly addressed at the NPT Review Conference.

(3) Strengthen the linkage between IAEA and UN Security Council for enforcement

The linkage of the IAEA and the UN Security Council, which is prescribed in the IAEA Statute, should be reinforced in a way that strengthens the capacity for enforcing non-proliferation rules.

(4) Proper combination among dialogue through ad hoc forum, incentives, and enforcement is important

In the meantime, addressing region-specific or issue-specific security concerns in multilateral for other than the UN or IAEA can provide effective ways to reduce nuclear threats, and supplement efforts through the UN or IAEA. The proper combination and balance among dialogue, incentives, and credible enforcement with possibility of sanctions should be utilized for resolving existing proliferation problems.

Recommendation 9: Deepen and widen international collaboration in developing proliferation-resistant technology and sophisticated safeguards and verification technology

A proper combination of political, institutional and technological measures would strengthen capabilities to cope with nuclear proliferation problems. In this sense, the development of proliferation-resistant technology is one promising approach to strengthening non-proliferation efforts. The international community should be further engaged in developing more proliferation-resistant fuel cycle and nuclear reactor technologies and more effective safeguards technologies, through international collaborations such as INPRO, GIF and GNEP. The technological approach to nuclear non-proliferation is important as it might create new ways to pursue nuclear energy while promoting non-proliferation. The technological approach and international cooperation to spur innovative research and development for safer and secure nuclear technologies could be effective approaches as they could supplement other non-proliferation measures.


The Partitioning and Transmutation (P&T) is an option for alternative Waste Management Strategy. The International collaboration for advanced reactor and fuel cycle development such as INPRO and GIF and the global suggestion for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, such as MNA and GNEP were importance for promoting the Co-operation and Collaboration for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.





About teteh ai

hi~ i am ai now i am a student in KAIST with major nuclear engineering, i also still officially work for Nuclear Energy Regulatory Body in Indonesia, ...lets go nuclear!!
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