“NUCLEAR POWER: LOOKING FOR THE FUTURE,THE 4TH KEY ISSUES OF NUCLEAR POWER TODAY”

“NUCLEAR POWER: LOOKING FOR THE FUTURE,THE 4^TH KEY ISSUES OF NUCLEAR POWER TODAY”

A. Introduction

The most important constraints on economic growth and development are the availability of energy. Nuclear power is the best source of energy for support the economic growth and development. There are four key issues for nuclear power to continue to be viable as a source of energy now and in the future: the economic of nuclear power, nuclear safety, spent fuel and radioactive waste management, and nuclear non-proliferation.

B. 4th Key Issues of Nuclear Power Today

1. The Economic of Nuclear Power

There is generally increasing pressure on nuclear power to be genuinely economically competitive with other large-scale energy sources, such as coal, oil and gas. To make nuclear power competitively economics, we need some strategy whether for the current nuclear power plant and for the new nuclear power plant. Here are certain strategies to improve the economics of nuclear power:

a. The economics of current nuclear power plants

The overall picture with current nuclear plants is very clear. They are operating more and more efficiently and operating costs are generally low relative to those of alternative generating technologies. These improvements have now become routine and will be integrated into the construction of new nuclear plants. Here are in detailed the economic improvement of the current plant (the existing plant):

a.1. High Plant Performance by High plant availability and Capacity Factor

The current plant have been operated more and more efficiencies and have more output is being achieved with each reactor through improved availability / capacity up-rates and operation will continue for many years in the future, backed by the necessary investment in refurbishment.

a.2. Operating Cost

OECD2 /NEA3 studies from 1983-2005 (OECD-NEA/IEA 2005 and earlier) [table1] show relative stability in the overall generating cost of nuclear power plants. This has resulted essentially from two different factors: Nuclear fuel costs have fallen due to lower uranium and enrichment prices together with new fuel designs allowing higher burnups, while O&M costs have now stabilized at levels competitive with other base-load generation.

a.3. Capacities Up rates

Up-rating the power output of nuclear reactors is recognized as a highly economic source of additional generating capacity. The refurbishment of the plant turbo generator combined with utilizing the benefits of initial margins in reactor designs and digital instrumentation and control technologies can increase plant output significantly, by up to 15-20%. There are many examples of this throughout the world, but it is a particular focus in Sweden, the United States and East European countries.

a.4. Licensing Extensions

The extending the lifetime of plants may allow the owner to reduce their annual depreciation charge thereby spreading decommissioning charges over an extended lifetime and further improving profitability. Existing well maintained NPPs have become valuable assets with excellent safety performance. Those effect wich result reducing the cost.

b. The economics of new nuclear power plants

The future of all reactors will depend on whether they can be economically built and operated. One of the major impediments to new nuclear construction is the capital cost due in large part to the length of construction time and complexity of the plant. Here are in detailed the economic improvement of the new nuclear power plant:

b.1. Reducing the capital cost of nuclear power

OECD-NEA (2000), highlights several areas where vendors have identified specific steps to reduce capital costs to a range they regard as feasible: $1000-1400 per kW of installed gross capacity. Key areas of cost reduction include the following:

1. Larger unit capacities provide substantial economies of scale, suggesting that nuclear plants should, for economic reasons, use higher-capacity reactors.
2. Replicating several reactors of one design on one site can bring major unit cost reductions.
3. Standardization of reactors and construction in series will yield substantial savings over the series.
4. Learning-by-doing can save substantial capital costs, both through replication at the factory for components and at the construction site for installation.
5. Simpler designs, some incorporating passive safety systems, can yield sizeable savings, as can improve construction methods.
6. A predictable licensing process can avoid unexpected costs and facilitate getting the new plant up to safety and design requirements at an early date to start electricity – and revenue – generation.

b.2. Low interest charge and the shorten the construction periods

Construction interest costs can be an important element of total capital costs but this depends on the rate of interest and the construction period. The low interest charge can reduce the cost of new plant. Since nuclear power projects are very much capital intensive, shortening the construction period is important to the interest charges during construction period. Construction period may be reduced through: (a) parallel construction technology; (b) increased composite modularization; (c) increased prefabrication; (d) better communication through information technology; and replication.

2. Safety of Nuclear Power

Second important key issue in nuclear power is nuclear safety. The TMI accident in 1979 and the Chernobyl accident in 1986 was clearly a setback to nuclear power. Many lives were lost. Thousands suffered major health impacts, and there were significant environmental and social impacts. The accident was the result of less than optimal reactor design, compounded by gross safety mismanagement. But ironically, this event also prompted major improvements in an approach to nuclear safety.

A key change was the development of a so-called international “nuclear safety regime”. The IAEA updated its body of safety standards to reflect best industry practices. International conventions were put in place, creating legally binding norms to enhance the safety of nuclear activities. A systematic analysis of risk was used to ensure that safety upgrades would be made in areas that would bring the greatest safety return. And, importantly, both the IAEA and the World Association of Nuclear Operators created international networks to conduct peer reviews, compare safety practices, and exchange operating information to improve safety performance.

The international nuclear safety regime has been demonstrating its effectiveness for two decades. But it would be a misunderstanding to regard nuclear safety as something that can be “fixed.” As IAEA Report, “Every [nuclear] operator must establish and maintain a ´safety culture´ in which management demonstrates that safety is the overriding priority and in which every member of staff recognizes his or her individual responsibility for safety.”

A key aspect of an effective safety culture is taking full advantage of operating experience. Experts note that serious nuclear safety events are almost always preceded by less serious “precursor” events. By taking prompt action based on the “precursors”, the probability of a serious accident can be reduced. But to do this effectively requires a number of things:

1. careful analysis of the root causes of events;

2. mechanisms that facilitate sharing this information with other nuclear operators worldwide; and

3. a commitment to transparency by all nuclear power countries and operators – including making use of peer review safety missions – as part of an ongoing process of mutual learning.

In that regard, many countries have requested an Integrated Regulatory Review Service to IAEA. This new service combines a number of elements ranging from nuclear safety and radiation safety to emergency preparedness and nuclear security. It includes a self-assessment aspect, and permits a comprehensive, participatory approach to evaluating a country’s safety performance.

3. Spent fuel and Nuclear Waste Management

The management of spent fuel and disposal of high level radioactive waste remain a challenge for the nuclear power industry. The amount of spent nuclear fuel produced annually – about 10 000 tonnes – is actually small when contrasted with the 25 billion tonnes of carbon waste from fossil fuels that is released directly into the atmosphere. Experts agree that the geological disposal of high level radioactive waste is safe and technologically feasible. But public opinion will likely remain skeptical – and nuclear waste disposal will likely remain a topic of controversy – until the first geological repositories are operational and the disposal technologies fully demonstrated.

The greatest progress on deep geological disposal has been made in Finland, Sweden and the United States. But it will still be more than a decade before the first such facility is operational.

In the meantime, the trend has been to construct and use above-ground interim storage facilities, and many countries are exploring the feasibility of interim storage for 100 years or more. An increasing number of countries are also interested in ensuring waste retrievability for future flexibility. Research is also progressing on the use of fast reactors and accelerator driven systems to incinerate and transmute long lived waste, in order to reduce the volume and radiotoxicity of waste to be sent to geologic repositories.

For some time, many countries start to consider the multinational approaches to the management of spent fuel and disposal of high level radioactive waste. More than 50 countries have their spent nuclear fuel stored in temporary sites, awaiting disposal or reprocessing. Many countries do not have the technology or appropriate sites for geological disposal, and the costs for countries with small nuclear programmes would be prohibitive.

4. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards for peaceful uses of nuclear energy

Nuclear security has also become a major concern in recent years.Perhaps the most serious concern relates to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the same time that we are seeing rising expectations for nuclear power, we are also witnessing concerns regarding the spread of sensitive nuclear technology. Particularly sensitive are nuclear operations such as enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing – activities that are part of a peaceful nuclear programme, but also can be used to produce the high enriched uranium and plutonium used in nuclear weapons. Countries that have such operations are only a short step away from a nuclear weapons capability.

There are four critical aspects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime that must be strengthen – addressing both symptoms and root causes – if we are to avoid a cascade of nuclear proliferation, and our ultimate self-destruction.

First, develop a more effective approach for dealing with proliferation threats. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA Statute make clear the reliance of the international community on the IAEA to verify States´ adherence to their non-proliferation obligations, and on the United Nations Security Council to act in cases of non-compliance. The present system offers an array of measures ranging from dialogue to sanctions to enforcement actions. But judging by our record in recent years, these measures have not been applied effectively to deal with proliferation issues. Second, secure existing nuclear material stockpiles and tighten controls over the transfer and production of nuclear material. Effective control of nuclear material is the “choke point” for preventing the production of additional nuclear weapons. Third, strengthen the verification authority and capability of the IAEA. Effective verification has four elements: adequate legal authority; state-of-the-art technology; access to all relevant information and locations; and sufficient human and financial resources. Fourth, urgently need to find a way for disarmament to be given the prominence and priority it deserves. Article VI of the NPT requires parties to the Treaty to pursue negotiations in good faith “on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”. It is now 37 years since the Treaty entered into force. Should we not be well past the date when States party should be developing new nuclear weapons?

C. Key Issue Advantage for Renaissance Nuclear Power In the Future

After we know the key issue and how to improve those key important issues, we will be able to answer the challenge of nuclear power renaissance in the future. Knowing the important issue will make us have “A NEW PARADIGM”: A New Nuclear Economic Paradigm, A New Nuclear Safety Paradigm, A New Nuclear Waste Management Paradigm and A New Nuclear Security Paradigm.

By having a new nuclear economic paradigm the existing and future of all reactors will be economically built and operated. By having a new nuclear safety paradigm the existing and future of all reactors will be maintain in safety condition and no more nuclear incident and accident. By having a new nuclear waste management paradigm the existing and future of all reactors waste will be manageable and public doesn’t have to worry about the waste of nuclear power.  By having a new nuclear security paradigm the existing and future of all reactors will secure from misused.

Those key issues are challenge for the nuclear society now, and those key issues will be solved by the international cooperation strategy. Now we have the Gen IV Cooperation and much other International collaboration, that cooperation are one of the step to answer the key important issue challenge in near future.

D. Conclusion

Nuclear power now in the crossroad to nuclear renaissance, to ensure that nuclear renaissance will be coming and nuclear power comeback as favorite energy source option are by answering 4 (four) key important issue today: : the economic of nuclear power, nuclear safety, spent fuel and radioactive waste management, and nuclear non-proliferation. Those key issues are challenge for the nuclear society now, and those key issues will be solved by the international cooperation strategy.

E. Reference

1. www.nrc.gov.

2. www.world-nuclear.org

3. www.iea.org

 

An Experimental study of Fullerene (C60) Nano-fluids on Pool Boiling Conditions

1. Introduction

Critical heat flux (CHF) is directly related to the performance of the system since CHF limits the heat transfer of a heat transfer system. Significant enhancement of CHF allows reliable operation of equipment with more margins to operational limit and more economic cost saving. The previous results show that the nano-fluids significantly enhanced pool boiling CHF compared to pure water. It was supposed that CHF enhancement was due to increased thermal conductivity of fluids, change of bubble shape and behavior, and nano-particle coating of the boiling surface. The previous researches also show that mainly the pool boiling experiment was employed metal particles. Fullerene (C60) is a novel carbon allotrope that was first discovered in 1985 by a winner noble “Sir Harold W.Kroto, Richard E. Smalley and Robert F.Curl Jr”. In this study we report the first CHF experiment in pool boiling conditions using Fullerene (C60) nanofluids.

2. Experiment

2.1. Preparations of nanofluids

The C60 particles are nearly water insoluble in water, because of their strong hydrophobicity and van der Waals attractions. As a way alternative to such chemical synthesis, water dispersion of C60 itself has recently attracted increasing interest for practical applications. Some methods based on reprecipitation, solvent replacement, and ultrasonications have been introduced to prepare the dispersion, and surfactant, polymer, or other detergents are often added.
In this study we use acid treatment as our method to have water dispersible Fullerene (C60).The fullerene [C60] used in this work was 99.99% pure from Sigma Aldrich. All the solvents and chemical reagents were from Aldrich.

2.2. Zeta Potential Measurements

The dispersion and stability of fullerene (C60) nanofluids were checked by measuring zeta potential. Zeta potential is an abbreviation for electrokinetic potential in colloidal system. In other words, zeta potential is the potential difference between the dispersion medium and the stationary layer of fluid attached to the dispersed particle. The significance of zeta potential is that its value can be related to the stability of colloidal dispersions. The zeta potential of Fullerene nanofluids were found in the range of mV . The zeta potential of nanofluids was constant for more than one month .

3. Boiling experimental facility and procedure

The CHF of deionized pure water and nanofluids was measured in the apparatus , which basically consists of horizontal flat surfaces heater submerged in the test fluid at atmospheric pressure.

4. Results and Discussions

4.1. CHF with fullerene (C60) nanofluids

For the prediction of CHF of pure fluids, Zuber’s (1959) correlation, has been used widely for the past years. The CHF for flat plate is predicted as 1110 kW/m2 by Zuber’s model for water under atmospheric pressure. The results data for CHF of pure water was approximately 50% lower than Zuber prediction, however the main focus of this present work is to investigate CHF enhancement using nano-fluids relative to CHF of pure water, the experimental CHF value of pure water in present work can be used as standar for subsequent CHF comparisons of nano-fluids. It was also reported by N. Barkhu and J.H. Lienhard that the prediction of zuber equation is not valid.
Significant CHF enhancement is observed for all concentrations content Fullerene (C60) nanofluids compare to pure water. CHF enhancement as compared to pure water occurs up to 108% for 0.01vol% fullerene (C60) nanofluids, up to 46% for 0.001vol% fullerene (C60) nanofluids, and up to 22% for 0.0001vol% fullerene (C60) nanofluids.

4.2. Heat Transfer Coefficients with fullerene (C60) nanofluids

The boiling curves in Fullerene nanofluids are shifted to the left of boiling curve in water. Its means the heater surface boiling in Fullerene nanofluids will generally have a higher nucleation site density causing this shift to the left.

5. Conclusions

The critical heat flux in pool boiling conditions is experimentally evaluated for Fullerene (C60) nanofluids. It is found several significant findings such as:
1. The zeta potential of Fullerene nanofluids were in the range of 41 mV. The zeta potential of nanofluids was constant for more than one month. It concludes that the treatment has been succeeded produces water dispersible Fullerene (C60) nanofluids with good stability.
2. Enhanced (~108.9%) CHF was observed for solutions with Fullerene (C60) nanofluids with concentration 0.01%.
3. The pool boiling HTCs of Fullerene (C60) nanofluids are higher than those of pure water in the entire nucleate boiling regime.

REFERENCES

[1] I.C. Bang, S.H. Chang, Boiling heat transfer performance and phenomena of Al2O3–water nano-fluids from a plain surface in a pool, Int. J. Heat Mass Transfer 48 (2005) 2407–2419.
[2] N. Zuber, Hydrodynamic aspects of boiling heat transfer, AEC Report AECU-4439, Physics and Mathematics, 1959.
[3] J.H. Lienhard, A heat transfer textbook, Prentice-Hall, p. 404, 1981.

[4] U.S Choi, Developments and Applications of Non-Newtonian Flows, ASME FED-Vol. 231/MD, vol. 66, (1995), PP. 99-105.

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The International Initiative Co-operation and Collaboration for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

“The International Initiative Co-operation and Collaboration for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy”

Executive Summary

The Partitioning and Transmutation (P&T) option as an alternative Waste Management Strategy is examined in this papers along different lines. The International collaboration for advanced reactor and fuel cycle development such as INPRO and GIF also address in this papers together with the cooperation between INPRO and GIF to avoid overlapping. The global suggestion for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, such as MNA and GNEP also describe in this paper together with pros and cons. The last of this final term paper is the description on importance of promoting the Co-operation and Collaboration for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy together with several recommendation for the international community to urgently address several issues.

1. The Role and Methodology  of  partitioning and transmutation (P&T) of spent fuel

The first approach is a global analysis of the present situation in the backend of the fuel cycle where it appears that two opposite concepts (direct disposal versus reprocessing and PU reuse) are equally important on the world scene. In order to allow P&T to be fully developed a doubling of the present conventional reprocessing capacity is required. The radioactive source term with long term implications is discussed and the relative importance of each of the long lived nuclides is quantified on the basis of their hazard index and its evaluation as a function of cooling time. The radiochemical and nuclear engineering data of Minor Actinides (MA) and Long Lived Fission Products (LLFP) show that, on the basis of their radio-toxicity indexes, the Pu 241 – Am 241 – Np 237 sequence has the greatest radiological impact followed by Am 243 as a precursor of Pu 239. In order to reduce HLLW to an actinide concentration level which is compatible with surface storage, very high DF’s are to be obtained. However a more reasonable approach is to reduce the concentration of MA and LLFP in a waste repository with a factor between 10 and 100 depending on the critical nuclide and on the prevailing hydrogeologic conditions. The reduction of the nuclide inventory will decrease the potential risk in the 1000 to 10.000 years period and reduce the time interval during which the proportionally decreased source term will determine the radiological impact of the repository on the geosphere.

The second field influencing the P&T option is the partitioning feasibility. Though extensive studies have been published on the partitioning of MA and LLFP an important effort will have to be accomplished in order to make the P&T option technologically valid. In the context of improved reprocessing the Np extraction deserves the first attention in order to quantitatively reroute this nuclide in one waste- or product stream, where it can be used as a starting point for transmutation operations. The extraction of Am – Cm from HLLW is still in the laboratory development stage but it appears that the coupling of an improved PUREX process flow sheet with the TRUEX process is capable of achieving a significant decontamination. The main issue to be resolved is the Am Cm / Rare Earth separation for which no fully satisfactory method is available. Among the LLFP, I-129 and Tc-99 are the most important ones and methods exist to transform them into a target for eventual transmutation. Other LLFP have only a limited radiological impact or cannot be separated unless isotopic separation is performed.

The third aspect of P&T is conditioning and fuel fabrication of MA which is the critical steps before transmutation can be envisaged. Np 237 can be homogeneously mixed with MOX fuel and submitted to irradiation in LWR and/or FBR’s, but the subsequent recycle operations will have to take into account increased Pu 238 concentration. Am – Cm recycle undoubtedly is the most difficult step since the separation from Rare Earths has not yet been accomplished on pilot scale and that a completely new remote handling technology has to be developed for that purpose. Pyrometallurgical processing of spent fuel to transform the MA into a new metal-alloy-type fuel is a new venture which needs a very large R&D effort to become comparable in confidence level with aqueous recycle methods.

The last and most important aspect of P&T is transmutation, which covers two distinct concepts: transmutation to a short lived actinide and/or incineration to fission products. Transmutation in LWR’S and HFR’s involves the transformation of Np 237 into Pu 238 and a buildup of a heavier isotope fraction of Am-Cm. Homogeneous recycling of MA in FBR’s is from reactor physics point of view feasible and the output of 6 LWR’S can be transmuted in one FBR of the same power. Heterogeneous recycle in FBR’s has principle advantages from fuel fabrication point of view but critical thermo-hydraulic problems have been encountered in the fuel assembly design. LMR’s and particularly ABR’s are the most suitable answers to the transmutation issue since their “incineration” potential is by far the highest among the fast reactors. The transmutation yield is yet limited to about 10 % per year which implies long transmutation periods for a given MA inventory. Accelerator driven transmutation is the most challenging option which will require very long R&D efforts to upgrade the high energy physics machines to production tools which can be operated in conjunction with a large nuclear inventory of MA arranged as a subcritical reactor vessel surrounding the proton beam inlet. The extreme high neutron fluxes attainable in such facilities provide a new outcome for long lived fission product transmutation.

2. International collaboration for advanced reactor and fuel cycle development.

2.1. International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO)

The 21^st century will have the most competitive, globalized markets in human history, the most rapid pace of technological change ever, and the greatest expansion of energy use, particularly in developing countries. As IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said at the 50th IAEA General Conference, in September 2006, technological and institutional innovation is a key factor in ensuring the benefit from the use of nuclear energy for sustainability.

The International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) was initiated in 2001, on the basis of a resolution of the IAEA General Conference in 2000 [GC(44)/RES/21]. INPRO activities have since been continuously endorsed by resolutions of the IAEA General Conferences and by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

INPRO provides an open international forum for studying nuclear energy options, the associated requirements and the potential deployment of innovative nuclear energy systems in IAEA Member States. INPRO helps to make available knowledge that supports informed decision-making during the development and deployment of innovative nuclear energy systems and assists Member States in the coordination of related Collaborative Projects.

INPRO’s initial activity (Phase 1, 2001–2006) focused on the development of an assessment methodology to be used for screening an innovative nuclear system (INS), for comparing different INSs to find a preferred one consistent with the sustainable development of a given State and for identifying R&D needs.

The INPRO methodology, tested for consistency and completeness, has been published and documented in two IAEA Technical Documents, Methodology for the Assessment of Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (IAEA-TECDOC-1434) and Guidance for the Evaluation of Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (IAEA-TECDOC-1362). An additional User’s Manual, consisting of an overview volume plus a separate volume for each INPRO area of assessment, is in preparation to provide additional guidance on applying the INPRO methodology.

2.2. Generation IV International Forum (GIF)

The Generation IV International Forum, or GIF, was chartered in July 2001 to lead the collaborative efforts of the world’s leading nuclear technology nations to develop next generation nuclear energy systems to meet the world’s future energy needs.

Taking into account the expected increase in energy demand worldwide and the growing awareness about global warming, climate change issues and sustainable development, nuclear energy will be needed to meet future global energy demand.

Eight technology goals have been defined for Generation IV systems in four broad areas: sustainability, economics, safety and reliability, and proliferation resistance and physical protection. These ambitious goals are shared by a large number of countries as they aim at responding to economic, environmental and social requirements of the 21st century. They establish a framework and identify concrete targets for focusing GIF R&D efforts.

2.3. Coordination between INPRO and GIF

INPRO and the IAEA work together with the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) to create synergy and to avoid overlap:

§ By sending experts to the GIF Policy Group and to GIF working groups (Risk and Safety, Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection, Evaluation Modelling);

§ By reviewing each other’s documents, such as the evaluation methodologies, as appropriate;

§ By organizing regular coordination meetings.

The differences between INPRO and GIF include the following:

1. Mission and activities: GIF is primarily focused on R&D of nuclear technology to meet global needs. INPRO has a broad variety of missions and activities, including providing a forum for experts on necessary innovation in nuclear energy, developing a methodology to assess innovative nuclear systems, providing common user considerations for the deployment of nuclear power in developing countries, and facilitating international cooperation on technological issues.

2. Membership: GIF membership is limited to those countries that can bring substantial resources and expertise to its R&D programmes, whereas INPRO members include both developed and developing countries. INPRO is open to all IAEA Member States. Currently, all members of GIF are also members of INPRO.

The complementary nature of INPRO and GIF and the potential for creating synergies on nuclear technology development have been recognized by both organizations. GIF focuses on R&D and a methodology for system development, and INPRO covers (1) the assessment methodology, (2) infrastructure and institutional aspects, and (3) assistance to Member States for Collaborative Projects. INPRO combines both technology holders and users, and takes into account the particular needs of developing countries.

3. Pros & cons on global suggestion for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, such as MNA and GNEP.

3.1. The MNA Initiative of the IAEA

It is important to note that the sensitive parts of the fuel cycle include not only enrichment of fissile uranium and reprocessing, but also long term storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive wastes (SNF/HLW). This point is made clear in the 2005 report published by the Multilateral Approaches (MNA) Expert Group that the Director General of the IAEA set up in mid-2004. The MNA report addresses the security and non-proliferation issues in a manner directly applicable to all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, and suggests five specific approaches for multinational initiatives. The proposals made have specific implications for storage and disposal strategies.

The MNA Group identified as factors influencing the assessment of multilateral approaches “assurance of nonproliferation” and “assurance of supply and services”. The former objective is clearly easier to achieve if multinational storage and disposal facilities can be made available. Leaving spent fuel in dozens of locations for many decades is obviously less proliferation resistant than collecting the material into a smaller number of facilities in stable host countries with very strong safeguards controls. There have, in fact, been various proposals from potential hosts and user countries for shared storage facilities that can be well secured. However, in practice, it will be difficult to transfer SNF/HLW to another country for storage without some clarity on the end-point of the agreement. Returning cooled spent fuel to many countries after several decades or returning HLW from reprocessed spent fuel would simply reinstate the current proliferation and security risks of dispersed storage. Moreover, accepting returned SNF or HLW would compel small countries to seek national deep disposal solutions – in which case they may as well have retained the fuel for disposal. In short, the assurance of non-proliferation sought by the MNA Group could be most expeditiously attained by early implementation of shared storage facilities – but only with the essential ingredient of an agreed further step of disposal in multinational repositories. These could be either in the countries storing the waste or in a limited number of other, volunteering, host nations.

The MNA Group recognizes in its report that there is currently no international market for storage or disposal and recommends that the IAEA supports the concept “by assuming political leadership to encourage such undertakings”. Specific ways forward are possible based on two multinational repository scenarios that have already been defined by the IAEA – “partnering” (between small nations) and “add-on” (acceptance of foreign fuel by a large nuclear nation), as documented in TECDOC 1314. It is emphasized correctly by the MNA Group that disposal and storage of SNF/HLW should not be looked at in isolation, but as part of a broader nuclear strategy. Some of the Group’s five suggested approaches for encouraging multinational initiatives have specific implications for multinational disposal.

One proposal is “reinforcing existing commercial market mechanisms”, e.g. by commercial fuel banks, fuel leasing and fuel take-back and commercial offers to store and dispose of spent fuel. Commercial market mechanisms in the past have made possible the transfer of SNF with no return of wastes, e.g. to reprocessing plants in France, the UK and Russia. Increasing public and political pressures on the organizations involved led to these services being withdrawn. The potential acceptability of reintroducing disposal arrangements could be greatly enhanced by IAEA support and by an IAEA commitment to oversee rigorously, or even to co-manage, the facilities.

The most promising multilateral approach for geological disposal may be “creating, through voluntary agreements and contracts, multinational, and in particular regional, MNAs for new facilities based on joint ownership, drawing rights or co-management”. This can be done for front-end and back-end nuclear facilities, such as uranium enrichment; fuel reprocessing; disposal and storage of spent fuel. Recent Russian enrichment proposals go in this direction. For disposal, interest in the partnering scenario that could lead to regional facilities is clearly evidenced by recent developments, in particular in Europe. The Arius Association, founded in 2002, currently pursues this concept as its main activity. The European Commission has promoted the concept of regional repositories in Europe in its Council Directive on “the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste” and is also funding the SAPIERR project, which is studying the potential for regional repositories in Europe.

Another suggestion is “promoting voluntary conversion of existing facilities” to MNAs. In the case of geological repositories, there are no facilities currently in existence, although several countries have advanced projects leading to implementation – in particular Finland, the USA, Sweden and France. Each of these, however, has made it very clear that the repositories are purely national and will not accept foreign fuel or wastes. The general consensus in the waste disposal community is that success in these programmes will help the cause of geological disposal world-wide. If this success is currently more assured by purely national approaches, it should not be interpreted as evidence that only national programmes can succeed. Of course, new multinational facilities might also be constructed in the “add-on” scenario, involving a large nuclear programme.

3.2. The US GNEP Proposal

In early 2006, President Bush announced the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), under which America intends to work with nations that have advanced civilian nuclear energy programmes, such as France, Japan, and Russia. The prime domestic aim is to develop and deploy innovative, advanced reactors and new methods to recycle spent nuclear fuel. GNEP is, however, also meant to provide a reliable fuel services programme, under which a consortium of nations with advanced nuclear technologies would provide fuel and reactors to other countries that agree to refrain from fuel cycle activities. The hope is to develop an international regime that will allow for fuel leasing, so that fuel can be leased to a country interested in building a reactor and taking fuel, but then the fuel can be taken back to the fuel cycle country. This fuel leasing approach would provide an incentive for nations to forgo enrichment and reprocessing technology. The recipient countries should benefit from “the certainty that fresh fuel would be available when needed and that used fuel would be taken back under agreed and reasonable terms”.

The brief document published by USDOE in January 2007 provides a timely and useful overview of the GNEP vision and of how DOE intends to implement this. The three goals:

• Wider-scale use of nuclear energy;

• decreasing risks of proliferation and nuclear terrorism;

• addressing the challenges of disposal;

are all of great importance for global environmental, safety and security reasons.

The plan concentrates strongly on technological issues associated with enhancing the US capabilities for undertaking key fuel cycle activities. This is obviously important because of the US expertise that has been lost over the past decades. It also highlights the view that GNEP can postpone for a long time the need for a second repository in the USA, provided that the facilities for advanced fuel cycle operations are brought on line. The strategy is however, needs to be strengthened in one key point – how to win the support of other nations and thus achieve success in the area of enhancing global security. This crucial issue is addressed below.

The DOE document claims that “the GNEP vision has been well received by the international community” – but continues with the phrase “particularly among the leading fuel cycle states”. However, support by such States is relatively easy to achieve; GNEP can only help to restrict the market in a way that helps providers of fuel cycle services. The consensus between the providers was illustrated following a meeting in May 2007 of officials from China, France, Japan, Russia and the USA, with observers from the UK and the IAEA [8]. They issued a statement addressing the prospects for international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially in the framework of GNEP. Secretary Bodman of the USDOE was quoted as saying, “Today’s Joint Statement officially puts the ‘P’ in the Global Nuclear Energy ‘Partnership”. However, GNEP can work on the hoped for global scale only if the “P” for partnership includes also the smaller or the new nuclear programmes (Tier 2 countries) around the globe – countries that are to be prevented from having fuel cycle facilities (enrichment and reprocessing) that are their right under the current NPT that they have signed up to.

Currently, the only real incentive being offered to these Tier 2 countries is “reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for civil nuclear power reactors”. However, they need to have guarantees that costs will be indeed reasonable and – perhaps more important – guarantees of security of supply of fuel cycle services. For some small countries, the existing US consent over transfer and use of US origin nuclear materials has had negative impacts in the past (e.g. delays in shipping fuel for countries like Switzerland; ban of reprocessing for South Korea, etc.). Why should small countries now welcome a new regime that even more firmly creates a two tier status in the nuclear world? Unless the USDOE also engages the small countries in discussion and unless it can offer greater incentives than at present, there is little or no incentive for them to buy-in to the GNEP initiative.

For enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactor construction and reprocessing there is already a sufficiently competitive market. No activities in these areas have been blocked or slowed due to a lack of willing vendors. With GNEP, this competitive market may well shrink. What extra incentives does GNEP offer? The most tangible additional service offer is the take-back of spent fuel. This could, in principle, be extremely attractive, since deep geological repositories for limited amounts of wastes are very expensive and are also difficult to site, for both technical and societal reasons. Removing the disposal problem from small nuclear programmes could outweigh the possible disadvantages that GNEP might bring them.

But will GNEP actually remove the problem? Currently the stated principles include “taking back spent fuel for recycling”. The text is silent about whether the HLW resulting from recycling will be retained by the recycling service provider. These wastes were previously retained in the case of the UK, France and Russia – but all of these subsequently altered this policy due to public and political pressure. Will the USA (and other Tier 1 GNEP countries) be able to accept foreign HLW) for final disposal? This question will certainly cause intense debate further down the GNEP line.

Already in its comments on the GNEP proposal, the State of Nevada has posed the following pertinent questions:

“Does DOE intend to take spent fuel from foreign reactors? If so, how much? Where will it be stored? Will this be only U.S.-origin spent fuel or fuel of other origins as well? Does DOE contemplate sending the foreign waste to a U.S. repository? The Draft PEIS must make clear DOE’s expectations on receiving foreign power reactor spent fuel and should factor that expectation into the GNEP option to be considered. The situation concerning radioactive wastes or spent fuel is, in fact, even more problematic. Small countries with existing modest inventories of spent fuel will have little incentive to send future spent fuel arising to a foreign recycler if they have to implement a national deep repository anyway. Moreover, even those countries that initiate civilian nuclear programmes under a GNEP agreement for returning spent fuel will have small quantities of other long-lived radioactive residues from activities in power production, research and industry – and these must also be disposed of in a geological repository. As was pointed out in the Russian case, a comprehensive geological disposal service will have much greater chances of acceptance by users.

Currently, the back-end issues associated with GNEP are open and no global impact can be guaranteed. The USA can still build its proposed new fuel cycle facilities, including advanced reactors and reprocessing plants, and can hope in this way to revitalize nuclear programmes in the USA and even to postpone the necessary decisions about a second national repository. However, to achieve fully the laudable global environmental and security goals, the back-end must be addressed directly. The overdue discussions to be held must include not only the Tier 1 service suppliers but also the potential Tier 2 service users. A key component of the GNEP strategy will be greatly strengthened when USDOE gets directly involved in communicating with the relevant organizations in Tier 2 GNEP states.

4. Promotions for international co-operation and collaboration for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Each country must be free to choose for itself the energy sources suited to its national interests, needs and conditions. None should be deprived of access to the technology for peaceful and safe utilization of nuclear power. However, in an increasingly interdependent world, as long as nuclear energy was in use, close international co-operation would be necessary to ensure, on the one hand, that nuclear technology is not abused or misused, and, on the other, that its benefits are made available in a safe and secure manner.

International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy could reach its full potential, only in a world from which its potentially destructive uses had been eliminated. Therefore, our great challenge is to establish universal principles for the promotion of nuclear energy to contribute to sustainable growth of the global economy, solution of global warming problems, and meeting energy security needs, in well balance with furthering efforts to pursue the reduction of risks posed by threats of nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism, and existing nuclear weapons. The peaceful use of nuclear energy should not be exploited to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities. It is extremely important for the international community to make a long-term, sustained commitment to a ‘balanced’ approach to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in a world that is safer from nuclear risks. Therefore, we recommend the international community to urgently address the following issues.

Recommendation 1: Establish the “Three S” as universal guiding principles for safe and secure development of nuclear energy activities

Due to dual nature and necessity of risk management of nuclear energy, states that intend to introduce peaceful nuclear activities must take into account; a) Safety of their facilities and operation; b) Security of facilities and materials; and c) non-proliferation (or Safeguards). (“Three S”: Safety, Security, and Safeguards) For safe and peaceful promotion, mechanisms for international cooperation should be established in the areas of technical assistance such as human resource development as well as sharing best practice in safety, security and non-proliferation activities.

Recommendation 2: Provide appropriate international financial assistance schemes to nuclear energy programs and projects in developing countries

Capital procurement would be a key to expand nuclear energy worldwide. Nuclear power generation needs a large initial capital investment and requires a long-term payback period. Therefore, the international community should offer innovative financial mechanisms, with which private and public investment for the construction of nuclear reactors would be facilitated.

Recommendation 3: Address nuclear energy as an effective tool for coping with global warming and make appropriate schemes to incorporate nuclear energy into such efforts.

Currently, there is no incentive or mechanism to facilitate the utilization of nuclear energy for environmental purposes while nuclear energy is quite effective in terms of reducing CO2 emission. Such discrimination against nuclear energy might undermine international efforts to cope with global warming. We urge the international community to acknowledge that nuclear energy would be an effective way to contribute to containing the increase of CO2 emissions. Relevant mechanisms should be available for nuclear energy projects. In particular, we back the creation of a policy mechanism to systematically incorporate the promotion of nuclear energy in the efforts to tackle global warming in the new round of negotiations.

Recommendation 4: Address safety and liability properly both in the domestic regulatory framework and in international cooperation

The international community should provide cooperation with states which would like to introduce nuclear energy, in establishing a regulatory framework and administrative capacities in properly addressing safety and liability.

Recommendation 5: Universalize the Additional Protocol and enhance the export control regime

(1) Pursue universalization of the Additional Protocol

I believe that universalization of the Additional Protocol (AP) to IAEA safeguards agreements is one of the most important and effective ways to check nuclear proliferation. I recognize that it would be difficult to make the AP obligatory now. However, in the spirit of cooperation, and given the shared interests in reducing nuclear threats, the international community must create a more effective way to utilize the AP in multilateral and bilateral ways, for the objective of non-proliferation.

(2) Make adherence to Additional Protocol a condition for nuclear trade

Strengthening export control measures is essential for preventing proliferation.

Recommendation 6: Explore ways to utilize Assurance of Fuel Supply and Multilateral Approaches to nuclear fuel cycle for promoting non-proliferation and sharing nuclear energy opportunities.

(1) Reliable assurance of supply as key to effective multilateral mechanisms

Assurance of fuel supply for non-nuclear fuel cycle states (or multilateral approaches to nuclear fuel cycle) has significance in shaping and embedding robust non-proliferation norms and habits in the international community. The introduction of such mechanisms would contribute to non-proliferation.

(2) Multilateral mechanisms should not create new nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’

International interdependence is already a fact in the area of nuclear fuel supply, and it will be increasingly important as most ‘national’ fuel cycle programs have international elements. Therefore, for some countries — such as those with small scale nuclear programs — it would be more efficient to rely on an international mechanism as a backup to fuel procurement through market mechanisms. Multilateral approaches may provide an alternative measure for states to procure nuclear fuels.

There is also concern that such mechanisms could fix the status of supplier states (or ‘nuclear haves’) and consumer states (or ‘nuclear have-nots’) – in other words, they could create another form of discrimination in the international nuclear order. Therefore, it is necessary for such a mechanism to be flexible enough to accept various types of contribution by member states, depending on what they can provide to the mechanism. Such mechanisms must be inclusionary rather than exclusionary.

Recommendation 7: Address concerns over the backend of fuel cycle

We should also look at the entire nuclear fuel cycle, from mining to spent fuel management. Most countries with civilian nuclear reactors face problems related to management of spent fuel. To make international assurance of supply credible and attractive, we need to address the management of the backend of the fuel cycle. Providing viable spent fuel management options would further increase the reliability of international mechanisms for managing the nuclear fuel cycle.

Recommendation 8: Strengthen enforcement and implementation mechanisms for non-proliferation

(1) Strengthen supplementary measures

Policy measures such as UNSCR1540 and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) are important elements of the international non-proliferation regime.

(2) Make conditionalities for withdrawal from NPT

The exploitation of the provision for withdrawal in the NPT (Article X) is a great concern. Conditionality for withdrawal from NPT may be properly addressed at the NPT Review Conference.

(3) Strengthen the linkage between IAEA and UN Security Council for enforcement

The linkage of the IAEA and the UN Security Council, which is prescribed in the IAEA Statute, should be reinforced in a way that strengthens the capacity for enforcing non-proliferation rules.

(4) Proper combination among dialogue through ad hoc forum, incentives, and enforcement is important

In the meantime, addressing region-specific or issue-specific security concerns in multilateral for other than the UN or IAEA can provide effective ways to reduce nuclear threats, and supplement efforts through the UN or IAEA. The proper combination and balance among dialogue, incentives, and credible enforcement with possibility of sanctions should be utilized for resolving existing proliferation problems.

Recommendation 9: Deepen and widen international collaboration in developing proliferation-resistant technology and sophisticated safeguards and verification technology

A proper combination of political, institutional and technological measures would strengthen capabilities to cope with nuclear proliferation problems. In this sense, the development of proliferation-resistant technology is one promising approach to strengthening non-proliferation efforts. The international community should be further engaged in developing more proliferation-resistant fuel cycle and nuclear reactor technologies and more effective safeguards technologies, through international collaborations such as INPRO, GIF and GNEP. The technological approach to nuclear non-proliferation is important as it might create new ways to pursue nuclear energy while promoting non-proliferation. The technological approach and international cooperation to spur innovative research and development for safer and secure nuclear technologies could be effective approaches as they could supplement other non-proliferation measures.

Conclusion

The Partitioning and Transmutation (P&T) is an option for alternative Waste Management Strategy. The International collaboration for advanced reactor and fuel cycle development such as INPRO and GIF and the global suggestion for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, such as MNA and GNEP were importance for promoting the Co-operation and Collaboration for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.

Reference

1. www.iaea.org

2. www.google.com